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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY v. MARTINEZ:
ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS
EDWARD J. SCHOEN
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK
I. INTRODUCTION
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,1 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the “all-comers” policy of the Hastings College of Law, a professional school
within the University of California higher education system, under which all
registered student organizations must allow any student to join, participate
and seek leadership position regardless of the student’s religious beliefs and
sexual orientation.2 Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy was challenged under
the First Amendment by the Christian Legal Society, a student organization
whose bylaws required all members to affirm their beliefs in enumerated
principles, including the precept that sexual activity should not occur outside
of marriage between a man and a woman, and refused membership to those
students whose religious beliefs differed from the Christian Legal Society’s
Statement of Faith or who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”3
Hastings denied official recognition of the Christian Legal Society as a
student organization, because its restrictive membership policy violated
Hastings’ all-comers membership requirements.4
In reaching its decision, the Court addressed several fundamental First
Amendment issues that collided forcefully in the parties’ dispute, namely
whether Hastings’ all-comers policy improperly imposed speech limitations
in a limited public forum, restricted the students’ freedom of association, and
denied organizational recognition because of the religious beliefs espoused
by the organization. Because of the importance of these issues and the deep
division of the Court in resolving them, careful analysis of the decision
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illuminates the direction the law may take in resolving future First
Amendment litigation.

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SCENARIO
Like many higher education institutions, Hastings encourages students
to form extracurricular associations to enhance their academic and social
interests outside the classroom and develop leadership skills.5 Hastings’
official recognition of student organizations confers significant benefits on
those organizations, including financial assistance funded by mandatory
student activity fees, access to the weekly newsletter, bulletin boards, and email systems to publicize club activities and recruit new members, as well as
the use of Hastings’ name, logo, meeting facilities, and office space.6
Hastings denies official recognition of student organizations, however, if
they fail to comply with its nondiscrimination policy, which requires that all
students must have the opportunity to join and seek leadership positions in
recognized student organizations regardless of the students’ status or beliefs,7
but permits recognized student organizations to enforce neutral membership
requirements such as payment of dues, attendance at meetings, and, in the
case of its law journals, strong writing skills.8
The Christian Legal Society adopted bylaws requiring all members and
officers to affirm a “Statement of Faith” confirming their belief in Jesus
Christ as savior, the Trinity, and the Bible as the inspired word of God, and
to conform their conduct to certain prescribed principles, such as the belief
that sexual activity should only be undertaken by a man and a women joined
in marriage.9 Because the adopted bylaws conflicted with the all-comers
policy, the Christian Legal Society sought an exemption from Hastings’
nondiscrimination policy.10 Hastings denied the Christian Legal Society’s
exemption application, because its bylaws barred student membership on the
basis of their religious beliefs and sexual orientation.11 The Christian Legal
Society filed suit against Hastings, claiming Hastings’ refusal to grant
official recognition violated its First Amendment rights to free speech,
expressive association, and free exercise of religion.12
The Federal District Court granted Hastings’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, ruling that Hastings’ denial of access to a limited public forum
5

Id. at 2978-79.
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was viewpoint neutral, that the denial of official recognition did not impair
the Christian Legal Society’s ability to meet and conduct group activities,
and that Hastings’ all-comer policy did not deny the right to expressive
association.13 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the all-comers policy
was viewpoint neutral and reasonable.14 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

III. IMPORTANCE OF PARTIES’ STIPULATION OF FACTS
Hastings and the Christian Legal Society entered into a stipulation of
facts submitted jointly with their motions for summary judgment which
provided: “Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”15
The Christian Legal Society attempted to argue before the U.S.
Supreme Court that Hastings enforced the all-comers policy inconsistently,
requiring only student associations organized on the basis of religious
beliefs or sexual orientation to comply with the policy and leaving other
student associations free to admit members on the basis of their ideology.16
The majority opinion rejected this argument, noting that the parties agreed
unqualifiedly that the all-comers policy presently governs student
associations and that, having entered into the stipulation, the parties are not
permitted to deny the truth of the stipulated fact or suggest on appeal that
the facts are other than those stipulated or that material facts are omitted.17
Rather, “a judicial admission . . . is conclusive in the case.”18 That being
so, the majority opinion “consider[ed] only whether conditioning access to
a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy
violates the Constitution.”19
The majority opinion’s insistence on adhering strictly to the parties’
stipulation was critical to the resolution of the case, because it permitted the
13

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 2982.
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Id.
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Id. at 2983.
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Id. The majority opinion castigates the dissenters for attempting to “undermine the
stipulation” and trying to cast doubt on “Hastings’ fidelity to its all-comers policy” by taking a
sentence in Hastings’ answer to the Christian Legal Society’s first amended complaint out of
context. In context, the majority opinion insists, the sentence confirms that Hastings applies
the all-comers policy to all groups. In any event, the majority opinion concludes, the parties’
stipulation supersedes the answer and extinguishes any conflict between them. Id.
19
Id. at 2984. The majority opinion criticizes the dissenters for suggesting the majority
opinion makes findings of fact about the all-comers policy and for devoting “considerable
attention to CLS’s arguments about the Nondiscrimination Policy as written.” Id.
14
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majority to focus on the limited public forum implications of Hastings’ allcomers policy and to avoid consideration of whether the all-comers policy
was selectively applied to religious groups, in which case the court would
have to consider violations of freedom of association. As noted below in part
IV, the former issue requires the court to investigate the reasonableness of
the policy and the latter issue requires the court apply strict scrutiny. As
discussed more fully in part VII below, if the latter test were applied,
Christian Legal Society would likely have been decided very differently.20

IV. FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES IN PLAY
Fundamental First Amendment principles collide in the appeal of the
Christian Legal Society: the constitutionality of restrictions on access to
government property; the constitutionality of imposing restrictions on
freedom of association; and the constitutionality of restrictions on student
organizations based on the members’ religious beliefs.
A. Government Restrictions on Public Forums
The first principle at issue in Christian Legal Society concerns the right
of a governmental unit to restrict the use of its own property. In resolving
this issue, courts employ four classifications of government property:
traditional public forums, government designated public forums, limited
public forums, and nonpublic forums. Traditional public forums, such as
streets and parks, “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”21 The government may impose reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions in traditional public forums, but any restriction based on

20
Brett G. Scharffs, May a Public Law School Deny Recognition to a Religious Student Group
Based on the School’s Nondiscrimination Policy? 37 A.B.A. PREVIEW 296, 304 (2010) (“The
key to the case probably lies in the facts the Court embraces as the basis for its analysis. If the
Court follows the lead of CLS and focuses on Hastings’ application of its nondiscrimination
policy in a way that seems targeted exclusively at a religious group, it seems likely that the
policy will be found to violate the First Amendment’s protections of free speech or
association. If, on the other hand, the Court accepts at face value the stipulated facts, that
Hastings applies the all-comers policy equally to all student groups, then it seems likely that
the Court will give the University sufficient latitude to adopt such a policy, even in the face of
the possibility of groups being sabotaged or hijacked by unsympathetic student participants.”).
21
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983); Hague v.
CIO, 59 S. Ct. 954, 964 (1939).
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the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny; that is, the restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.22
Governments create designated public forums when “government
property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is
intentionally opened up for that purpose.”23 Thus, for example, a state
university creates a designated public forum when it adopts a policy of
permitting registered student groups to use its facilities for meetings,24 a state
creates a designated public forum by passing a statute requiring open school
board meetings,25 and a city creates a designated public forum when it
designs and dedicates a municipal auditorium for expressive activities.26
Speakers cannot be excluded from designated public forums without a
compelling interest, and restrictions are subject to the same strict scrutiny
applicable to traditional public forums.27
Governments create limited public forums when they permit their
property, which is neither a traditional nor a designated public forum, to be
used for communication purposes but restrict use of the property to
designated groups or certain topics.28 The public does not have access to
government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government, and the government may, as the owner of the property, impose
time, place and manner regulations, and reserve the property for a limited
and dedicated use.29 Thus, for example, a school district creates a limited
public forum when it allows the union representing the teachers access to the
interschool mail system.30 The school district may also permit identified
groups, such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and civic and church organizations
22
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985); Carey v.
Brown, 100 S. Ct. 2286, 2291 (1980). The U.S. Supreme Court most recently considered a
restriction on speech in a traditional public forum in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.
Ct. 1125 (2009), in which the Court was asked to decide whether the refusal of the city to
permit a religious organization to display a monument containing a statement of its religious
principles in Pioneer Park violated the First Amendment. The Court acknowledged that
Pioneer Park was a traditional public forum and any restriction on the use of that forum must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 1132. The Court
decided, however, that the right of Pleasant Grove City to engage in government speech by
deciding what monuments to place in Pioneer Park trumped public forum analysis, because
requiring the City to display all donated monuments would lead inexorably to the destruction
or closing of the forum. Id. at 1138.
23
Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3449.
24
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
25
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 97 S. Ct. 421, 426, n. 5
(1976).
26
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 95 S. Ct. 1239 (1975).
27
Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3448; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. at 955.
28
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. at 955.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 956.
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to use the mail system, but deny access to a rival union, without danger of
converting the mail system into a designated public forum.31 Because the
school mail system is not a public forum, the school district is not required to
permit any organization to use the school mail boxes.32 As long the decision
of the school district to limit access is reasonable, the restriction does not
violate the First Amendment.33
Governments create nonpublic forums when they restrict the use of their
property to a limited purpose which would be disrupted if broader access
were permitted or when the excluded use of the forum is inconsistent with
the purpose for which the property is normally is utilized. For example, the
decision of a city to permit “purveyors of goods and services” to place
advertisements on its city transit vehicles, but to refuse access to politicians
seeking advertising space does not violate the First Amendment, because no
public forum was created. 34 Rather, the city sought to “minimize chances of
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive
audience,” and these objectives were reasonable.35 Similarly, governments
can provide restricted access to military reservations and jailhouse grounds
without being forced to permit wider public access, because the use of the
property would be disrupted by broader public use.36 Likewise, the federal
government may restrict the charitable organizations listed on the Combined
Federal Campaign Contributor’s Leaflet used as part of the annual charity
drive aimed at federal employees to “nonprofit charitable agencies that
provide direct health and welfare services to individuals or their families.”37
Without such a limitation, the federal government would potentially have
been forced to permit 850,000 charitable organizations to participate by
printing their thirty-word descriptions on the leaflet.38 Because unlimited
participation would disrupt the workplace and destroy the effectiveness of
the charitable campaign, the federal government can exercise control over
access.39 Hence the Combined Federal Campaign was deemed to be a
nonpublic forum,40 and the federal government is permitted to control access
on the basis of “subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 2717 (1974).
35
Id. at 2718.
36
Greer v. Spock, 96 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1976) (“[T]he business of a military installation [is] to
train soldiers, not provide a public forum.”); Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242, 247 (1996)
(noting that protestors have no right of expression “on that part of jail grounds reserved for jail
uses”).
37
Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3342-43.
38
Id. at 3451.
39
Id.
40
Id.
32
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drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served and are viewpoint
neutral.”41
B. Restrictions on Freedom of Association
Governmental restraints on freedom of association and freedom not to
associate are subject to close scrutiny and may not be upheld unless “they
serve ‘compelling state interests’ that are ‘unrelated to the suppression of
ideas’ – interests that cannot be advanced ‘through . . . significantly less
restrictive means.’”42 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,43 the U.S.
Supreme Court confronted conflicting admission standards to the Jaycees, an
organization founded in 1920 as the Junior Chamber of Commerce.44 Local
Jaycee chapters in Minneapolis and St. Paul admitted women as regular
members, contrary to the national Jaycee bylaws which restricted
membership to men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.45 The
national organization advised both chapters that that their charters would be
revoked, and the two chapters, alleging the exclusion of women from full
membership was a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, filed charges with the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights.46 The Minnesota Department of
Human Rights determined that the revocation of Jaycee charters of the
Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act,
and the national organization brought suit against state officials in the federal
district court, contending that requiring the organization to admit women
violated the male members’ rights of free speech and association.47 The
federal district court certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question
whether the Jaycees was a “place of public accommodation within the
meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”48 The Minnesota Supreme
Court decided the Jaycees organization was a place of public
accommodation, because it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange
for membership dues, and the Jaycees amended its complaint to ask the
federal district court to consider the constitutionality of that determination.49
41

Id. at 3451-52.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2784 (2010) (holding that freedom of association includes the right not to
associate); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782, 1799 (1977).
43
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
44
Id. at 3247.
45
Id. at 3248.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
42
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The federal district court ruled in favor of the state officials, and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Jaycees engaged in
advocacy of political causes and mandating the membership of women
“would produce a ‘direct and substantial’ interference with that freedom,”
because the change in membership would “necessarily result in ‘some
change in the Jaycees’ philosophical cast.’”50 Minnesota’s interest in
eliminating discrimination, the court concluded, was insufficiently
compelling to outweigh the Jaycees’ constitutional right of association.51
The U.S. Supreme Court closely considered the admission requirements
utilized by the Jaycees, and determined the membership in local Minnesota
chapters was neither small (the Minnesota chapter had about 430 members
and St. Paul about 400 members) nor selective. New members were
admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds and the national organization
imposed no requirements other than age and sex.52 This caused the Court to
conclude the Jaycees was essentially an organization of strangers, rather than
an organization selecting members on the basis of personal or intimate
affinity or affiliation, to which constitutionally protected freedom of
association applied.53 While the members of Jaycees do have associative
rights to pursue political, economic and ideological interests, that right does
not, the Court concluded, overcome “Minnesota’s compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens.”54 Further, Minnesota
advanced this interest “through the least restrictive means of achieving its
ends,”55 and the Jaycees failed to demonstrate how Minnesota’s antidiscrimination policy imposed “any serious burdens on the male members’
freedom of expressive association,” or how the admission of women as full
voting members impedes participation in such activities.56 Consequently, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and upheld the right of
the Minnesota Jaycee chapters to admit women as full voting members.57

50

Id. at 3249.
Id.
52
Id. at 3251.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 3253.
55
Id. at 3254.
56
Id. at 3255.
57
The same result was reached in Board of Directors of Rotary International. v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the admission
of women to membership in the Rotary Club pursuant to California’s equal accommodations
law did not violate the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association, in the absence
of evidence the admission of women would restrict the accomplishment of organizational
objectives or interfere with the organization’s classification and admission systems, because
“the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or private relation
that warrants constitutional protection. “ Id. at 1946.
51
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In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,58 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the expulsion of James Dale from the Boy Scouts
because he was homosexual. Active in scouting from ages eight to eighteen,
Dale applied for adult membership as an Assistant Scout Master of Troup 73.
His membership was approved around the time he left home to attend
Rutgers University. At Rutgers, he became active in the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance, advocated increasing gay role models for homosexual teenagers,
and was identified in a newspaper article as the co-president of the
Lesbian/Gay Alliance.59 The Monmouth Boy Scout Council revoked his
adult membership, because Boy Scouts policy denied membership to
homosexuals.60 Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the New
Jersey Superior Court, alleging his expulsion violated New Jersey’s public
accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.61 The New Jersey Superior Court ruled that the Boy Scouts was
not a place of public accommodation, but rather was a “distinctly private
group exempted from coverage under New Jersey’s law, and that the Boy
Scouts’ policy of not admitting homosexuals was protected by the First
Amendment freedom of expressive association.”62 The New Jersey Superior
Court’s Appellate Division reversed, holding that the public accommodations
law applied to the Boy Scouts and was violated by the expulsion of Dale.63
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, deciding that the Boy Scouts was a
public accommodation and that, because the membership of the Boy Scouts
was large and nonselective and inclusive rather than exclusive, and because
the organization’s practice was to invite or allow nonmembers to attend
meetings, the membership of the Boy Scouts was not sufficiently personal or
private to warrant First Amendment protection under the freedom of intimate
association.64
The U.S. Supreme Court preliminarily laid the foundation of its freedom
of association analysis by focusing on the Boy Scouts’ mission statement,65
the Scout Oath,66 and the Scout Law,67 all of which, the Court emphasized,

58

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
Id. at 2449.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2449-50.
62
Id. at 2450.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2451.
65
“It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in
young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in
achieving their full potential.” Id.
66
“On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and country and obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and
morally straight.” Id. at 2451-52.
59
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underscored the core purpose of the Boy Scouts to instill a system of values
and moral beliefs through engagement in expressive activity.68 Further, the
Boy Scouts claimed, “it does not want to promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior” and teaches homosexual behavior is not
“morally straight,”69 and its position statement maintained: “The Boy Scouts
of America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a
privilege and not a right. We do not believe that homosexuality and
leadership in Scouting are appropriate.”70 Admitting Dole to adult
membership in the Boy Scouts as an assistant scoutmaster, the Court noted,
“would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to
the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”71
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston,72 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council (“the Veterans Council”), an unincorporated association of
individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups which
annually organizes and conducts Boston’s St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day
Parade (“the Parade”), could not be compelled by the government to allow
the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (“GLIB”), a social
organization of persons who are homosexual or bisexual and their supporters,
to march in the parade.73 The Court initially determined that the Parade was
expression for purposes of the First Amendment. It was a festive event in
which people in costumes and uniforms, marching bands and floats, and
colorful flags and banners entertained the spectators lining the streets and the
television viewers in their homes.74 While conceding the Veterans Council
was rather lenient in admitting diverse groups with a wide range of messages
to its parade, relaxed admissions requirements did not forfeit the parade
organizers’ constitutional protections.75 Rather, the Court noted, the First
Amendment protects the parade organizers’ rights to assemble a multifaceted
message of their own choosing, much the same way as the First Amendment
protects cable operators’ selection of programs to be rebroadcast and
newspaper editors’ assembly of diverse voices on the editorial page.76
67

“A Scout is: Trustworthy, Obedient, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave, Clean, Kind,
Reverent.” Id. at 2452.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 2453.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
73
Id. at 2341, 2350.
74
Id. at 2345.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2345-46.
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Because GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in and
communicating its ideas as part of the Parade,77 the "state court’s application
of [the public accommodations act] produced an order essentially requiring
petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.”78 Such compelled
speech violates the fundamental autonomy given to the speakers under the
First Amendment to choose the content of their own message.79 The Court
continued:
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the
speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would
rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation.
Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by
business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in
unsophisticated expression as well as by professional publishers.
Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, which is to
shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are
misguided, or even hurtful (citations omitted).80
Roberts, Dale and Hurley provide significant First Amendment
protection of the freedom to associate and not to associate, namely that
government restrictions on associational relationships must serve compelling
interests that cannot be attained through less restrictive means. That
protection, however, is not provided unless the associational value of
membership in the organization is clear and strong. In Roberts, the
associational value of membership in the Jaycees was deemed to be weak,
because the Jaycees were not selective in their membership and did not
demonstrate how admitting women would burden the members’ participation
in expressive activities. Hence, the need to eliminate discrimination against
women prevailed over the Jaycees’ freedom of association. In Dale, the Boy
Scouts created a clear system of values and beliefs, promulgated those values
and beliefs unambiguously in its organizational mission statement, scout
oath, and scout law, and instilled those values and beliefs in its members.
The Boy Scouts’ values and beliefs held that homosexual activity was
morally wrong, and the admission of homosexual scout leaders directly
contradicted what the organizations stood for.
Hence, because the
associational value of the Boy Scouts was strong, it prevailed over the private
organization’s discrimination against homosexuals.
In Hurley, the
77

Id. at 2347.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2347-48.
78
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expressive activity was the annual parade, and the parade organizers had a
long history of deciding what organizations could and could not participate in
the parade. While the expression emanating from the parade was diverse and
the admission standards were lenient, the associational value in terms of the
participants’ expression was sufficiently strong to overcome the need to
eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation.
C. University Restrictions on Student Organizations Based on Content of
Expression
The U.S. Supreme Court has on at least three occasions dealt with
university restrictions on student organizations based on the content of their
expression. In Healy v. James,81 students at Central Connecticut State
University filed a request to establish a local chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society, and a Student Affairs Committee approved the
application and recommended recognition of the chapter.82 The president of
the University, however, rejected the recommendation, and issued a
statement denying the chapter the benefits of official campus recognition,
because he found the organization’s philosophy antithetical to the school’s
policies and to academic freedom.83 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the
denial of campus recognition violated the First Amendment.84 While the
Court recognized that universities can require campus organizations to affirm
their willingness to adhere to campus policies governing student conduct,
universities cannot suppress the organization’s speech or association simply
because it finds the views expressed to be abhorrent.85
In Widmar v. Vincent,86 a registered student religious group,
Cornerstone, asked the University of Missouri at Kansas City to provide
meeting space for its members.87 The policy of the University was to
encourage the activities of student organizations and to provide facilities for
their meetings, and, pursuant to that policy, the University permitted
Cornerstone to meet on campus. In 1977, however, the University Board of
Curators changed the policy to prohibit the use of buildings and grounds for
the purpose of religious worship or teaching.88 Student members of
Cornerstone brought suit to challenge the regulation on the grounds it

81

Healy v. James, 92 S. Ct. 2338 (1972).
Id. at 2342.
83
Id. at 2343.
84
Id. at 2352.
85
Id. at 2349, 2352-53.
86
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
87
Id. at 272.
88
Id.
82

Fall 2011/Schoen & Falchek/213

violated their right to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech.89 The
U.S. Supreme Court determined that, having established a limited public
forum for student expression, the University was required to demonstrate its
regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was
narrowly constructed to achieve that end.90 The Court rejected the
University’s argument that it was obligated by the Establishment Clause91 not
to provide its facilities to religious groups.92 Rather, the Court concluded,
providing meeting space for Cornerstone neither confers approval of its
religious principles or practices nor empowers the religious organization to
dominate the limited public forum.93 Further, providing meeting space to
religious groups does not interfere with the University’s capacity to establish
reasonable time, place and manner regulations.94 Having created a limited
public forum to student organizations, the University is not permitted to
impose content-based exclusions on speech, religious or otherwise.95
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 96 the
University of Virginia withheld payment to an outside contractor for printing
a student newspaper produced by Wide Awake Productions, a recognized
student organization which promoted Christian values and viewpoints.97 The
University normally paid outside contractors for expenses related to student
news, information, and opinion, but excluded student religious organizations
from its disbursement request program.98 When Wide Awake Publications
submitted a disbursement request for the cost of printing its newspaper,99 the
University denied the request because of the religious perspective of the
newspaper.100 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of
Virginia's refusal to pay the publication costs of the Wide Awake
Productions’ newspaper constituted government-imposed viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.101 Having established a

89

Id.
Id. at 274.
91
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend I.
The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
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limited public forum for the expression of various student viewpoints,102 the
University was prohibited by the First Amendment from excluding Wide
Awake Publications because it advocated a Christian perspective.103 The
Court further determined the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a
student newspaper promoting a Christian perspective does not violate the
Establishment Clause, because the university's student activities fee, unlike
taxes levied for direct support of a church or group of churches, was "neutral
toward religion."104
In Healy, Widmar and Rosenberger, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the attempts by universities to restrict access of student organizations
to limited public forums because of their viewpoints. Having created and
sanctioned the limited public forum, the university was required to “respect
the lawful boundaries it has itself set,”105 and the First Amendment prohibits
universities from excluding speech on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.

V. MAJORITY OPINION IN CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
After dealing with the parties’ stipulation of facts and the Christian
Legal Society’s attempt sidestep it, as discussed in part III above, the
immediate issue confronting the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding what test
to apply to resolve the First Amendment issues presented. As noted above in
part IV, government infringement on freedom of association is governed by
the strict scrutiny test, while government restrictions on speech in limited
public forums are governed by the reasonableness test. The Christian Legal
Society argued that Hastings’ imposition of the all-comers policy violated
their rights of association and religious speech and that the two tests should
be considered separately.106 The majority opinion107 deftly rejected this
argument, and determined that Hastings’ efforts to promote student
organizations established a limited public forum,108 and that limited public
forum analysis adequately respects and fairly balances the Christian Legal
Society’s religious speech and expressive-association rights.109 The Court
102
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explained that it “makes little sense” to consider Christian Legal Society’s
religious speech and association arguments as two separate lines of
argumentation, because “expressive-association and free speech arguments
merge”110 and the “limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate
framework for assessing [Christian Legal Society’s] speech and association
rights.”111 Further, Hastings’ all-comers policy merely withheld benefits
rather than required admission of all applicants for club membership - as the
Court noted, it simply dangles “the carrot of subsidy” rather than wields “the
stick of prohibition” - it is more fitting to apply the less-restrictive limitedpublic forum analysis.112
Having determined that the limited public forum analysis was
applicable, the Court reiterated the appropriate test to be applied to the allcomers policy: the university may not prohibit speech if its decision
discriminates on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.113 Deferring to the
significant discretion of colleges and universities to assemble its educational
and extracurricular programs, the Court considered the justifications
advanced by Hastings in support of its all-comers policy:114 open access
maximizes the opportunities of student attainment of leadership positions in
110

Id. at 2985.
Id. The Court reasoned: (1) the speech and association interests of the Christian Legal
Society were closely intertwined, and it would be “anomalous for a restriction on speech to
survive constitutional review under our limited public forum test only to be invalidated by an
impermissible infringement of expressive association”; (2) strict scrutiny analysis applicable
to “expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of
limited public forums,” namely that the state is permitted to reserve them for certain groups;
and (3) Hastings’ student organization program imposes only indirect pressure on the
Christian Legal Society to change its membership requirements. In other words, the Christian
Legal Society could (and in fact did) choose to forego the benefits of recognized organization
status in order to limit its membership rather than being directly compelled to accept members
it objected to.
112
Id. at 2986. Two commentators strongly object to the Court’s characterization of denying
access to campus facilities as “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition.” William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The
Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 473, 486
(2010) (“By equating access to a limited public forum as a form of subsidy, the Supreme
Court accepted the premise that recognition and/or funding of student groups is a subsidy.
However, since ‘the government generally need not subsidize the exercise of constitutional
rights,’ universities may require student organizations to admit those who disagree as a
condition of receiving benefits. If anything, characterizing recognition as a subsidy
‘undervalues the expressive interests at stake.’ Moreover, although there are significant
distinctions between recognition of a student organization and financial payments to support
that organization's activities, the Opinion of the Court does not distinguish between
recognition and funding. Indeed, the Court's student organization jurisprudence has never
distinguished between recognition and funding.”).
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student organizations,115 reduces the policing requirements in enforcing its
nondiscrimination policy,116 and encourages cooperation and tolerance
among students with diverse backgrounds.117 Those justifications, the Court
concluded, support its all-comers requirement, and “are surely reasonable in
light of the recognized student organization forum's purposes.”118 Further,
the Court noted, the Christian Legal Society, although denied access to the
law school’s electronic means of communications, was able to host a variety
of activities and significantly increase student participation.119 Finally, the
Court emphasized, “requiring all student groups to accept all comers”120 does
not distinguish groups based on their message or perspective, and is
“textbook viewpoint neutral.”121
While it conceded Hastings’ all-comers policy was “nominally
neutral,”122 the Christian Legal Society argued that the all-comers policy
“systematically and predictably [burdened] most heavily those groups whose
viewpoints are out of favor with the campus mainstream.”123 The majority
opinion dismissed this argument, because “[a] regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”124 The Court
noted:
Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups wishing to
enforce exclusionary membership policies, “[w]here the [State]
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts
are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy.125
115
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Hence, in the majority opinion’s view, Hastings’ all-comers policy
attempts to make sure members would not be rejected for membership in
student organizations because of their religious beliefs or sexual orientation,
and that objective constitutes an adequate explanation for its policy separate
and apart from the Christian Legal Society’s assertion the all-comers policy
represented disagreement with student organizations’ beliefs.126 That being
so, the Court concluded, “Hastings’ open-access condition on [Recognized
Student Organization] status [was] reasonable and viewpoint neutral,” and
the “[Christian Legal Society’s] free-speech and expressive association
claims” must be rejected.127
Finally, the Court rebuffed the Christian Legal Society’s argument that
Hastings’ all-comers policy violated the Free Exercise Clause, determining
that “the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise
valid regulations of general application that incidentally burden religious
conduct”128 and that the Christian Legal Society, in requesting an exemption
from the all-comers policy sought “preferential, not equal, treatment,”
precluding its free exercise argument.129

VI. DISSENTING OPINION IN CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
The dissenting opinion130 rests on its contention that “strong evidence”
exists showing Hastings applied its all-comers policy as a pretext to engage
in viewpoint discrimination,131 and cites the following evidence for this
resentment in others on the basis of their race, color, creed, religion or gender, even though
narrowly construed by the state supreme court to address “fighting words,” violates the First
Amendment on its face, because it prohibits speech on the basis of the subjects addressed in
the speech)).
126
Christian Legal Society, 130 S. Ct. at 2994.
127
Id. at 2995.
128
Id. See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to
prohibit sacramental peyote use and to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for
such use. Oregon law prohibited the possession of controlled substances, and two employees
of a private drug rehabilitation organization were fired because they ingested peyote, a
controlled substance. The fired workers claimed they did so as a sacramental practice of the
Native American Church in which they were members. Their ensuing applications for
unemployment benefits were denied, because they were fired for work-related misconduct.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided the denial of unemployment benefits did not violate the Free
Exercise clause, because individuals are obligated to comply with criminal laws that
incidentally prohibit the performance of religious practices, as long as the law is not directed
specifically to the religious practice.
129
Christian Legal Society, 109 S. Ct. at 2995.
130
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131
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proposition: (1) Hastings recognizes more than sixty student organizations,
but “in all its history” denied recognition to only one, the Christian Legal
Society132; (2) Hastings admitted in its answer to Christian Legal Society’s
first amended complaint that it “permits political, social, and cultural student
organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a
particular set of ideals or beliefs”133; (3) inconsistencies existed in documents
and depositions as to when the all-comers policy was implemented134; (4)
Hastings “routinely registered student groups with bylaws limiting
membership and leadership positions to those who agreed with the groups'
viewpoints,”135 but required the Christian Legal Society to comply with the
all-comers policy136; (5) Hastings inconsistently described its all-comers
policies in various legal briefs137; (6) substantial differences existed in
Hastings’ nondiscrimination and all-comers policies138; and (7) Hastings
cited its nondiscrimination policy (rather than its all-comers policy) as
grounds for denying the application of Christian Legal Society for an
exemption.139
The dissenting opinion also disagrees with the conclusion of the
majority opinion that the Christian Legal Society suffered no harm from its
non-recognition. While Hastings offered to provide facilities for the Christian
Legal Society meetings, its requests were given low priority and the
administration routinely failed to respond to its requests for meeting space
until after the date requested had passed, including the Christian Legal
Society’s request to set up a table to recruit members on the campus patio at
the beginning of the academic year.140 Further, denied access to funding
through student fees and to the electronic means of communication provided
by Hastings, membership in the Christian Leadership Society declined to
seven members.141 The dissenting opinion also chides the majority opinion
for emphasizing the Christian Legal Society’s ability to endure
discrimination:
This Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of unlawful
discrimination with the observation that the effects of the
discrimination were really not so bad. We have never before taken
132
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the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable. Nor
have we taken this approach in other discrimination cases.142
Because Hastings arguably used its all-comers policy to discriminate
against the Christian Legal Society viewpoints, the dissenting opinion relies
on Healy for the proposition that refusal to recognize a student organization
because of its viewpoint and to deny it access to campus facilities and
customary means of communication among members of the college
community burdens the student members’ right of association.143 Further,
the minority opinion insists, the court in Healy rightfully refused to grant
deference to the college president, because it is the responsibility of the court
to exercise its own judgment on the interpretation and application of free
speech.144 Moreover, granting the application of limited public forum cases
to Hastings’ all-comers policy, the minority opinion maintains that Hastings
violated the requirement of viewpoint neutrality, because its refusal to
recognize the Christian Legal Society impermissibly discriminated on the
basis of religion and sexual orientation.145
If the dissenting opinion’s insistence that Hastings’ all-comers policy
was used as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination had prevailed, Hastings’
decision not to recognize the Christian Legal Society would likely have been
governed by the strict scrutiny test applicable to association infringement
cases. The Christian Legal Society employed stringent admission standards,
required its members to affirm their belief in the group’s religious principles,
and conducted activities aimed at inculcating those beliefs in its members.
Given the high associational value of membership in the Christian Legal
Society, forcing the Christian Legal Society to accept members who did not
share its beliefs compelled it to contradict the values it stood for. Were strict
scrutiny applied to review Hastings’ actions, it is doubtful the law school’s
purported interests for imposing the all-comers policy - exposing students to
differing views, maximizing the availability of student leadership positions
and encouraging cooperation and tolerance - would be deemed compelling in
the eyes of the dissenting justices. Further, following Healy, the dissenters
certainly would not likely have given deference to the judgment of academic
organizations regarding student activities and organizations.146 Hence, using
strict scrutiny, Hastings’ imposition of the all-comers policy would likely
142
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have been deemed to infringe on the Christian Legal Society members’
freedom of association, and Hastings would have been required to recognize
the Christian Legal Society and grant an exemption to its admission
criteria.147

VII. SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
The majority opinion in Christian Legal Society is significant in three
ways. First, the decision to uphold the all-comers policy is confined to
limited public forums of colleges and universities. More particularly, the
decision permits academic institutions to require that student activities and
organizations to admit all students regardless of their viewpoints or sexual
orientation and to deny access to state university property if the recognized
student organization refuses to compromise on its admission standards.148 To
pass First Amendment muster in this arena, the academic institutions’
requirements need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. By avoiding
the issue of freedom of association, the majority escaped a much wider and
more difficult issue of whether or not “religious groups, as well as other
types of expressive association, have the right to discriminate in the selection
of their voting members and officers.”149 As noted by Professor Scharffs:
The principles articulated in this context could have significant
implications on so-called charitable choice programs, where
religiously affiliated groups that provide social services are able to
receive federal funding and are also allowed . . . to discriminate on
147

“The choice of the ‘reasonable’ and viewpoint-neutral test - that is, the choice of the
appropriate doctrinal box or category on the First Amendment case law flowchart - essentially
dictated the result. If a different box had been chosen, a different (and more stringent) test
would have applied, and a different result might very well have been obtained.” Vikram
Amar, “The First Amendment in the 2009 Term: It’s All About How You Frame It”, 37 A.B.A.
PREVIEW 347, 350 (2010).
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Two commentators express a spirited counter argument: “In Christian Legal Society, the
Supreme Court discounted the student organization's Freedom of Association argument while
ignoring the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Instead, the Court held that the government
has the ability to restrict freedom of association as a condition of accessing limited public fora.
Put another way, the Court decreed that if groups want to use governmental property or
channels of communication, they must be willing to compromise their missions by including
those who disagree with their messages. In order to be a Registered Student Organization or
use an auditorium in the wake of Christian Legal Society, Christians must accept non–
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Thro & Russo, supra note 112, at 484.
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the basis of religious preference in their hiring of personnel. It
could even have implications for entities that receive tax
exemptions and discriminate in the selection of their employees or
leaders (something every church and most religious groups do).150
The majority opinion was able to limit the confines of the decision to
college and university public forums by the deft manner in which it
concluded that limited public forum analysis “adequately respects and fairly
balances” the Christian Legal Society’s religious speech and expressiveassociation rights.”151 No precedent was cited in direct support of this
conclusion, which now stands as precedent, and the arguments asserted in
support of it, summarized in part VI above,152 are weak. Presumably
limitations on rights of association in college and university public forums in
the future need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral to survive First
Amendment challenges.
The majority opinion in Christian Legal Society is also significant,
because it granted deference to the judgment of academic administrators:
“determinations of what constitutes sound educational policy or what goals a
student-organization forum ought to serve fall within the discretion of school
administrators and educators.”153 Granting deference to Hastings educational
discretion likely pleased the Association of American Law Schools, which
submitted a brief “emphasizing the importance of institutional autonomy and
urging that law schools should have wide latitude in determining how to
develop strong and effective programs,” and asking the court not to
constitutionalize a policy issue involving “sensitive educational
judgment.”154 Granting deference likely did not please “religious groups and
other expressive association [which] have submitted amicus briefs on behalf
of CLS [The Christian Legal Society], arguing that a holding in favor of
Hastings would have significant negative implications for their rights of
association and free speech.”155
Finally, the case is significant because of the paucity of attention paid to
the free exercise doctrine. The Christian Legal Society devoted “only about
one page of [its] brief to arguing that Hastings’ policy violated [its] free
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exercise of rights,”156 and the U.S. Supreme Court devoted one short footnote
dismissing the argument.157

VIII. CONCLUSION
In Christian Legal Society, the U.S. Supreme Court wrestles with three
fundamentally important First Amendment issues: government restrictions on
access to limited public forums, government restrictions on freedom of
association, and government restrictions on student organization expression
based on the content of that expression. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
uses limited public forum analysis to uphold Hastings’ imposition of the allcomers policy on its student organizations. The implication of that decision
is that limitations on rights of association in college and university public
forums in the future need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral to survive
First Amendment challenges. In reaching its decision, the majority opinion
sidesteps the more difficult issue of whether or not religious and expressive
association groups have the right to discriminate in the selection of their
voting members and officers by concluding that public forum analysis
adequately protects religious speech and expressive-association rights.
By arguing vehemently that Hastings failed to apply its all-comers
policy consistently and thereby improperly infringed on the Christian Legal
Society’s religious expression and freedom of association, the dissenting
opinion seeks to evaluate Hastings’ actions under the strict scrutiny test
applied in association infringement cases. Had the dissenters been successful
in doing so, the decision would likely have gone the other way, opening the
door to permitting religious and expressive association groups to discriminate
in selecting voting members and officers.
The manner in which these three competing interests are resolved in
Christian Legal Society strikes the authors as being rather like the ancient
game of “Rock – Paper – Scissors.” in which participants use hand gestures
symbolizing the rock, paper, and scissors to defeat an opponent. Gestures are
resolved by the following rules: rock breaks scissors; paper covers rock,
scissors cuts paper. In Christian Legal Society, First Amendment principles
are like the competing hand gestures. Healy, Widmar and Rosenberger,
156
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Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, forecloses that argument. In Smith,
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid
regulations of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. Id., at 878-882,
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which impose significant restrictions on the ability of academic organizations
to restrict student organization speech and which mandate such limitations
must be viewpoint neutral, are the rock. Dale and Hurley, which provide
significant prohibitions against infringements on the freedom to associate and
overturn the admission of members to clubs and organizations that have
strong associational bonds unless there are compelling reasons and narrowly
tailored means, signify the paper and therefore defeat the rock. Finally, in the
majority view, limited public forum requirements, which accept restrictions
on access to public forums if they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral, are
the scissors, and scissors triumphs over paper.
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